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1. Introduction 
In this presentation paper I shall explore the normative thinking behind intellectual 
property rights. I shall argue that there are two main lines of defence for the idea that 
the institutions of intellectual property rights (IPRs from now on) are morally 
justified: the consequentialist and the non-consequentialist or deontological line. My 
thesis in this paper is that both of these clusters of arguments suffer to some extent 
from flawed reasoning and, if IPRs are to be justified at all, these lines of argument 
are in need of revision. Finally I shall present some related philosophical questions 
that are in need of addressing in this context. 
 
2. The Normative Sources of Intellectual Property Rights 
The Intellectual Property Rights are a set of legal apparatuses designed to protect the 
interests of the inventor or holder of an idea by a special institution of ownership. The 
World Intellectual Property Organisation, which operates under the mandate of the 
United Nations, has proposed that Intellectual Property shall include the following 






• trade secret 
• design and related rights. 
The legal scope of each of these groups is distinct and has local variations in existing 
legal systems. My aim here is to briefly examine and illustrate the moral justifications 
given to this arrangement in total. 
 
The relationship between law and morality has been one of the traditional questions in 
jurisprudence. As the influential legal philosopher Lon Fuller writes, moral thinking 
provides the necessary normative basis without which law as an institution would 
simply be impossible.1 This is a simple descriptive notion: no matter what, we cannot 
eliminate moral underpinnings from legal arrangements. The issue is, rather, what 
those underpinnings are and whose morality is represented in the law’s letter – i.e., 
what the morality in the law ought to express. 
 
Moral philosophy is preoccupied in determining the different sources of normative 
thought on which legal institutions can or will be founded, that is, whether there is a 
single set of principles to guide all normative thinking or whether the principles are 
necessarily diffuse and vary from case to case. 
 
There is a moral account or a normative standing behind every position holding IPRs 
as valuable – a proposed moral justification – that can be made explicit and inquired 
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about philosophically for soundness. This is the task to which I set myself in this short 
essay. 
Every position one in favour of IPRs relies on the idea that the ownership of ideas is a 
good or a right thing – i.e., has value. This value can be either extrinsic or intrinsic: 
IPRs are valuable either because they enable other, intrinsically valuable things, or, 
they can be seen as valuable in themselves. This divides the possible positions in two 
clusters: the consequentialist cluster that holds IPRs valuable as a necessary tool for 
other goods and the non-consequentialist or deontologist cluster that seeks to justify 
IPRs as valuable in themselves. 
 
Before assessing these competing positions, some conceptual clarifications are in 
order. First, Intellectual Property Rights are rights of exclusion. As Peter Drahos 
writes, by claiming ownership of an idea the holder of an IPR appropriates the idea 
from the Intellectual Commons.2 Before the appropriation takes place, the idea is 
common game (or non-rival good) in a rather radical sense: it cannot be exhausted by 
exploitation (or else, we’d be forced to define exhaustion in quite an alien manner). 
Therefore, the appropriation by claiming an IPR is exclusion in an equally radical 
sense. 
 
What, then, is an idea? The existing intellectual property laws cover a broad scope of 
different ideas by this single concept: an idea can be held to mean a medical formula, 
a computer programme, a smiley, a certain combination of shapes and colors in 
furniture or clothing, a type of animal of certain partially artificial genetic structure, a 
certain combination of sounds, and so forth. An idea is always a type and never a 
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token; yet all we can perceive are tokens of these types, and therefore IPRs set limits 
to the proper and improper expressions of these ideas. Idea, then, in the sense that 
intellectual property laws see it, is the idea itself – and all the possible expressions it 
can have. 
 
Hence, the norms expressed in intellectual property laws set standards to both 
properness of attribution and appropriation of the idea, as well as properness of 
expression of the idea. The norms are thus threefold: they are norms of a) attribution 
(or, who is properly recognized as the originator of the idea), b) appropriation (or, 
who is the proper holder of the rights of exclusion), and c) expression (or, what is a 
proper expression or token of the idea). 
 
It could be argued that some of the ethical questions concerning copying arise from 
this linking of three quite different sorts of norms too closely together. For instance, 
does proper attribution entail rights of exclusion or standards of expression? Or, why 
do the rights of exclusion extend also to the tokens or the materials of expression of 
the idea? These are philosophical questions that call for serious discussion. 
 
3. The Deontological/Nonconsequentialist Cluster of normative sources 
The Natural Rights view 
The first cluster of moral justifications for IPRs that I consider is the 
nonconsequentialist one. There are three possible positions that can be held in this 
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manner: a natural rights based view, a fairness based view, and a Hegelian identity 
based view. All of these positions hold in common that IPRs are to be treated as 
having intrinsic value and as expressions of fundamental rights of one sort or another. 
 
The first of these, the natural rights view, can be, for example, found in an articulate 
form in the writings of Robert Nozick3 and his followers4. The argument stems from 
the thinking of John Locke and Immanuel Kant, and proceeds in the following 
manner. John Locke argues in his Second Treatise on Government, that man has 
natural rights to his “life, liberty and estates”, rights that include his natural 
endowments and capabilities. Property is created by mixing ones labour and effort in 
with nature in order to produce something hitherto nonexistent – so long as: 1) it 
leaves “enough or as good as” for everyone else to enjoy and no-one’s wellbeing is 
lessened by the appropriation; and 2) as long as nothing goes to waste.5 
 
Robert Nozick argues that this is the case with intellectual property as well. Ideas are 
fruits of labour just like any other, and people are entitled to natural property rights to 
them.6 According to Nozick, they fulfil the two aforementioned provisos of non-waste 
and “leaving-enough-or-as-good-as” because human beings have a limitless 
imagination, and by making ideas private property they can be exploited to the 
maximum. Further, following Kant, he argues that the violation of these property 
rights is a violation of the Categorical Imperative: if people are denied this natural 
right, they are being used as a means and not as an end in themselves. Therefore, the 




However, objections can be made. First of all, Nozick is not well aware of the 
problem that arises from the norms of expression included in IPRs. This trouble can 
be best seen in patent rights: a patent covers not only an idea, but also other ideas 
similar to it, or different ideas applied in the same purpose as the original idea, 
depending on specific scope of the patent in question. Same goes with copyrights: 
similarities with Mickey Mouse or Windows will earn a legal issue in copyright 
infringement, even though the ideas would be autonomous in their own right. 
 
The more specialized, complex and vital the idea protected, the more is the first 
Lockean proviso violated. Medical patents are a paradigmatic example of this: there 
can not be anything as good as a single protected molecular structure that is the only 
one that fits the purpose of saving human lives from a medical condition. In one 
sense, the appropriation of a vital or otherwise high-utility idea lessens the relative 
wellbeing of everyone else. 
 
The fulfilment of the non-waste proviso is also dubious. First of all, the appropriation 
of an idea does not entail the exploitation of the idea to the maximum as a logical 
consequence. In fact in many cases IPRs are used as competitive arsenal to prevent 
competitors from exploiting an idea. The claim that making an idea a form of private 
property will maximize its exploitation is empiric in nature, wherein it is open to 
question. Whereas ideas are non-rival goods by nature, privatization is actually a form 
of wasting the idea’s inherent potential. 
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4. The Rawlsian scheme of intellectual property 
The second position, the fairness view, can be formulated by following the thinking of 
John Rawls.7 One attempt at this can be found in the writings of David B. Resnik, 
who conjures up the Difference Principle in defence of IPRs.8 The argument goes as 
follows. 
 
Differences in wellbeing within a society are to be tolerated only if the difference 
benefits in one way or another also the worse-off –-by creating incentives for 
industriousness, for example. IPRs are privileges that create differences in wellbeing 
by limiting the free use of ideas; but on the other hand, they are also fair 
compensations for effort. By administrating IPRs as a system of rewarding inventors 
for their efforts, the society creates spill-off benefits: IPRs encourage innovations, and 
these innovations also trickle down goods to the worse-off members of the society. 
Therefore, the normative basis of the IPRs is to be found in the principles of 
distributive justice and fairness. 
 
However, there are some problems in this view too. Fairness in itself is a first-order 
principle that dictates only the general rules by which benefits and burdens should be 
distributed within a society. It does not dictate exactly how this distribution is to take 
place. A fair compensation for innovative effort could be admitting rights of 
exclusion, or it could be something else: a bunch of flowers and a warm handshake, 
perhaps. IPRs as such are not a necessary conclusion from the principles of fairness; 
we still need to discuss in more detail the second-order principles to determine the 
exact contents of rewards. In the above example, Resnik confuses a second-order 
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principle of utilitarianism to be equivalent with the first-order fairness; but the 
second-order principle can be either utilitarianism or something else. 
 
This opens the door for considerations of fairness from the viewpoint of all others that 
are excluded from the use of the idea. Do not the principles of fairness also oblige the 
appropriator of the ideas to benefit those excluded in some way? For example, we 
could formulate the principles of fairness in such way that the more vital the idea is, 
the more open the access to it should be. The fairness view thus formulated does not 
give a satisfying justification for the forced marriage between the norms of attribution 
and the norms of appropriation and expression. 
 
5. The Identity based view 
A growing number of writers have recently been defending what might be called an 
identity-based view.9 Flowing from a more or less Hegelian/Marxian undertow that 
considers the creative process and the related recognition to be important parts of a 
personal identity project, they tend to argue that protecting ones right to original self-
expression is vital to ensure the autonomy of their will and personality. 
 
This is more or less a diffuse way of arguing; in general it may be said that these 
types of argument see the idea and its expression as metaphysical extensions of their 
creator’s personality or moral essence. The identity view has much in common with a 
natural rights view, especially in that people have a natural right to the fulfilment and 
flourishing of this essence. Accordingly, the purpose of intellectual property laws is to 
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protect this right from the intrusions of others’ wills into one’s essence. This view 
gives special emphasis to the norms of attribution. 
 
More can be said about this view, and it surely deserves a better examination than I 
am capable of doing here. This type of argumentation is typically rehearsed in the 
context of unique artistic expression, and its application beyond this context is 
dubious: the fulfilment of the creative human nature is typically not the first item in 
the agenda of the multinational companies that propagate strong IPRs in software or 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Are the works of artistic expression analogous to 
software or medical formulae – in that they are unique expressions of a creative mind 
as suggested? And if entertainment or design becomes industry in the sense that it 
exploits to the maximum the methods and benefits of mass production, do we not lose 
some of the original appeal of this type of argument? I would suggest that we do; 
however, this rich line of argument needs to be examined more fully elsewhere. 
 
6. The Consequentialist cluster 
The second cluster of arguments seeks moral justification from the consequences of 
institutions of IPR. This may be articulated as an utilitarian view or an economist 
maximizing view of IPRs. They hold in common that IPRs are nothing more and 
nothing less than policy tools that maximize the benefits of some or another 




This is the utilitarian ethos behind all economic models of IPRs, and can be found in 
the common argument that IPRs are necessary as an incentive to maximize 
innovations that in the end contribute to the net wellbeing (often equated with GDP) 
of the whole society. The norms of attribution and appropriation strictly flow, 
therefore, from the other goods that they enable to become maximized. 
 
The validity of this line of defence is dependent on the truth-value of the claim that 
the IPRs help to maximize the net wellbeing of the society at large. The nature of this 
claim is empirical, and therefore outside the scope of purely philosophical assessment. 
However, it should not be taken as an a priori assumption as it so often is. This claim 
originates historically from an age of more closed and less complex economies, and 
has not been widely re-examined since. 
 
There are several reasons why this case of argumentation is flawed. The first is that 
economic models are easily underdetermined by facts. An economic model is a 
theoretical construct that cannot be applied to reality in a straightforward manner, but 
needs a set of ceteris paribus clauses and additional assumptions to find connection 
with the reality of empirical facts. The truth value of the model relies on these 
additional assumptions. If the number of assumptions added to the model has no 
limiting factor, we can basically draw a caricature, where any two competing but 
contradictory, equally elegant models of explanation can be used to explain the same 
set of facts. The facts themselves do not determine which model is true; hence they 
are underdetermined by facts. We cannot choose rationally between models solely on 
the basis of facts, but need other values and ideological preferences to make a choice. 
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This is the case in the IPRs too: the model where IPRs maximize the net wellbeing is 
often presented as the only possible option, whereas this apparently is not the case. It 
is simply a matter of technical effort to design a competing model that fulfils the same 
net result. This might be interpreted as a simple call for alternatives, rather than a 
strong argument for refutation of IPRs in total, if so wished. 
 
The consequentialist view has also disputable assumptions about the targeted ends, 
even if we accept the models as holding some truth value. Is, for example, the 
maximum number of innovations an intrinsic good of such proportion that it can 
outweigh all the trade-offs? This remains a question open for debate. 
 
7. Some concluding questions 
To refute the moral justification of the IPRs is not to refute them overall, as the above 
may suggest. We have, so to speak, refuted the antecedent, which does not entail the 
refuting of the consequent as well. The remaining, here undisclosed argument in 
defence of the IPRs would be a legal positivist view that sees IPRs as purely 
contractarian and/or conventional institutions. 
 
I would like to dedicate the remainder of this paper for opening some questions. The 
first question is: ought there to be “one Idea to rule them all”, as suggested in the 
intellectual property laws? Many of the philosophical problems arise from the 
background that ideas of all sorts are treated in equal terms as intellectual property. 
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This, in a philosophical or conceptual sense, does violence to the diversity of ideas 
and their origin, and results in a rather clumsy and easily exploitable legal apparatus. 
The second question is addressed to the background assumptions concerning our view 
of the creative process that underlies the IPR institutions. The norms of attribution 
often exclude the fact that ex nihilo nihil: every idea has a history of influencing 
factors, and that originality of ideas is actually quite limited. We humans as creative 
beings are “dwarves on the shoulders of a giant”, so to speak. Strong IPRs imply a 
Romantic age myth of the solitary creative genius. Should this conception be revised, 
and if so, how should the IPR institutions be restructured to match our best knowledge 
of innovation process? 
 
Third question arises from extending the concept of ‘property’ to intellectual matters 
by terms of analogy from material property. This  reasoning by analogy is best 
observed the comparing an IPR violation to theft. By rights there ought to follow 
other features involved in property rights than mere ownership, such as the questions 
of distributive justice and equality, should this analogy be proper. How should we 
address the questions of intellectual wealth, in contrast to the appropriating non-rival 
goods from the Intellectual Commons? Does the distribution of intellectual property 
meet our conception of distributive justice? Or, in the case that we abandon the 
“property metaphor” and treat IPRs as a wholly new and autonomous type of rights, 





In these questions to feed further thought on the subject I shall end this brief paper, 
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